Fear of Floating by Calvo, Guillermo A. & Reinhart, Carmen M.
First draft: January 12, 2000
This draft: September 25, 2000
Fear of Floating
Guillermo A. Calvo
  University of Maryland and NBER
Carmen M. Reinhart*
University of Maryland and NBER
Abstract
In recent years, many countries have suffered severe financial crises, producing a staggering toll
on their economies, particularly in emerging markets. One view blames fixed exchange rates--
“soft pegs”--for these meltdowns.  Adherents to that view advise countries to allow their
currency to float. We analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, the monetary aggregates,
interest rates, and commodity prices across 154 exchange rate arrangements to assess whether
“official labels” provide an adequate representation of actual country practice. We find that,
countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not--there seems to be an
epidemic case of “fear of floating.” Since countries that are classified as having a free or a
managed float mostly resemble noncredible pegs--the so-called “demise of fixed exchange rates”
is a myth--the fear of floating is pervasive, even among some of the developed countries. We
present an analytical framework that helps to understand why there is fear of floating.
JEL Classification: F31, F33, F41
-
*The authors wish to thank Enrique Mendoza, Vincent Reinhart, Carlos Végh and seminar
participants at the Hoover Institution conference on “Currency Unions,” Stanford, California,
Summer Camp, Paracas, Peru, International Monetary Fund and the NBER’s Summer Institute
2000 in International Finance and Macroeconomics for very useful discussions and Ioannis
Tokatlidis for superb research assistance.
1 See, for example, Goldstein, (1999).
2 The textbook definition of a floating exchange rate regime posits money as the nominal
anchor and assumes that central banks do not intervene in the market for foreign exchange.  For a
fuller discussion of what fixed versus flexible exchange rates entail, see Calvo (2000).
3 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), make this point as well.




During the past few years, many countries have suffered severe currency and banking
crises, producing a staggering toll on their economies, particularly in emerging market countries. 
In many cases, the cost of restructuring the banking sector has been in excess of twenty percent
of GDP and output declines in the wake of crisis have been as large as 14 percent. An
increasingly popular view blames fixed exchange rates, specifically “soft pegs,” for these
financial meltdowns.1 Not surprisingly, adherents to that view advise emerging markets (EMs) to
allow their currency to float. 2
At first glance, the world--with the notable exception of Europe--does seem to be
marching steadily toward floating exchange rate arrangements.  As shown in Table 1, according
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ninety-seven percent of its member countries in 1970
were classified as having a pegged exchange rate; by 1980, that share had declined to thirty-nine
percent and, in 1999, it was down to only eleven percent. 3 Yet, this much-used IMF
classification takes at face value that countries actually do what they say they do. 4  Even a
cursory perusal of the Asian crises countries’ exchange rates prior to the 1997 crisis would
suggest that their exchange rates looked very much like pegs to the U.S. dollar for extended
5 See McKinnon (2000) for convincing evidence on this issue.
6 Indeed “fear of floating” is only part of a more general “fear of large exchange rate
swings,” particularly in EMs.  This reluctance to allow the exchange rate to adjust significantly
and rapidly is also manifest in the many episodes during which central banks go to great lengths
to avoid a devaluation.
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periods of time.  Only Thailand, however, was explicitly classified as a peg--and one to a basket
of currencies at that; the Philippines was listed as having a freely-floating exchange rate, while
the others were lumped under the catch-all label of managed floating.  Today, these countries are
classified as floaters, yet, as they vigorously recover from the turmoil of 1997-98, their exchange
rates have ceased to fluctuate in any significant way. 5
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, the
monetary aggregates, interest rates, and commodity prices across the spectrum of exchange rate
arrangements to assess whether the “official labels” provide an adequate representation of actual
country practice.  The data spans monthly observations for thirty-nine countries during the
January 1970-November 1999 period. One-hundred-and-fifty-four exchange rate arrangements
are covered.  
We present an analytical model that suggests that, even in the best of times, when
countries retain voluntary access to international capital markets, lack of credibility will lead to
fear of floating, high interest rate volatility, and procyclical interest rate policies. 6 We discuss
some of the reasons why countries may be reluctant to allow large swings in their exchange rates. 
Some of the key empirical findings are as follows: Countries that say they allow their
exchange rate to float mostly do not--there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear f floating.”  
Relative to more committed floaters--such as the United States, Australia, and Japan--observed
3
exchange rate variability is quite low.  The low variability of the nominal exchange rate does not
owe to the absence of real or nominal shocks in these economies--indeed, relative to the United
States and Japan most of these countries are subject to larger and more frequent shocks to their
terms of trade.  This is hardly surprising, given the high primary commodity content of their
exports in many cases.  
The low relative exchange rate variability stems from deliberate policy actions to stabilize
the exchange rate.  Reserve volatility (contrary both to what would be expected in a floating
exchange rate regime or relative to what is observed in the more committed floaters) is very high.
Interest rate volatility (both real and nominal) is significantly higher--and in a different league
altogether--from that of the “true(r)” floaters. The high volatility in both real and nominal interest
rates suggests both that countries are not relying exclusively on foreign exchange market
intervention to smooth fluctuations in the exchange rates--interest rate defenses are
commonplace--and that there are chronic credibility problems. The monetary aggregates also
show a high degree of variability relative to the more committed floaters.  As with interest rates,
this variability may owe to procyclical monetary policy aimed at smoothing exchange rate
fluctuations.  
The evidence suggests that commodity prices (in the local currency)--which drive the
fluctuations in the terms-of-trade of many commodity exporters in our sample--are far more
volatile than the exchange rate.  Apparently policy makers allow the exchange rate to adjust as
only a partial absorber of these real shocks, at best.  Indeed, in most cases there is no correlation
between commodity prices and the exchange rate–consistent with the view that the exchange rate
may not be allowed to adjust in response to terms of trade shocks.
7  For evidence on the reasons behind fear of floating, see Calvo and Reinhart (2000b)
and Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999).
8 See, for instance,  Baxter and Stockman (1989), Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1997)
and Edwards and Savastano (1998) for a review of this literature.
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As to the interaction among these variables, we find that, consistent with the hypothesis
of lack of credibility, the correlation between the exchange rate and interest rates is positive in
most instances.  Furthermore, in two-thirds of the cases, the correlation between reserves and the
exchange rate is negative.  This may be interpreted as contemporaneous leaning-against-the-
wind.
Lastly, because countries that are classified as having a managed float mostly resemble
noncredible pegs, the so-called “demise of fixed exchange rates” is a myth. Instead, the fear of
exchange rate movements is pervasive, even among some of the developed countries.7 Our
finding, that most of the episodes that come under the heading of floating exchange rates look
more like noncredible pegs, may help explain why earlier studies, which relied on the official
classifications of regimes, failed to detect important differences in GDP growth rates and
inflation, across peg and the “floating” regimes.8
In Section II, we present an analytical framework to explain why the authorities may be
so reluctant to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate; the model, which stresses credibility
problems, provides well-defined predictions for the behavior of exchange rates, the monetary
aggregates, and nominal and real interest rates.  Section III provides an analysis of the data for
the various exchange rate arrangements in our study, while Section IV examines the temporal
and contemporaneous interaction among the variables of interest and contrasts these with the
predictions of the model. The concluding section touches on some of the implications of our
9  For a discussion of these issues, see Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) and Hausmann,




II. Varieties of Fear of Floating
Motivated by the evidence presented in this paper, we first explore in this section why
lack of credibility may give rise to fear of floating, procyclical policies, and volatile interest rates,
even in “normal periods”--when countries maintain voluntary access to international capital
markets.  We then discuss other reasons why policy makers may dislike large exchange rate
swings.
1. Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility
  Despite their heterogeneity, EMs tend to share a common characteristic--they appear to be
reluctant to let their currencies fluctuate.  This leads us to conjecture that there may be at least
one common cause--lack of credibility.   If credibility is not conferred–the monetary authority has
no authority.  Expectations will rule the day.  These credibility problems may be manifested in
multiple ways, including volatile interest rates and sovereign credit ratings.  Furthermore, lack of
credibility may give rise to liability dollarization and limit the central bank’s ability to act as an
effective lender of last resort, all of which feed this fear of large exchange rate swings. 9 
  We can use a simple version of a conventional monetary model to put more structure on
the lack of credibility conjecture.  Let us assume that the demand for money satisfies the
following Cagan form:
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where m and e are the logs of the money supply and the nominal exchange rate, and Et is the
mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available in period t (which
includes money supply and exchange rate in period t.  The interest-semi-elasticity parameter is
denoted by .  
 For simplicity, consider the case in which money supply in periods 2 onwards takes a
constant value .  Then one can show that in a Rational Expectations equilibrium we havem
Thus, the exchange rate in period 1 (which we could identify with the present) is a weighted
average of present and future money supply.  Moreover, and by the same token, et = for  t =m ,
2, 3,. . . .  On the other hand, assuming (again, for simplicity) perfect capital mobility and that the
international interest rate equals zero, we have that the nominal interest rate it = et+1 - et satisfies
Case 1.  Permanent Increase in Present m.  Suppose that the economy was at steady state (i.e.,
money supply constant at  and it is shocked by an unanticipated once-and-for-all increase inm)
the supply of money in period 1.  By (2) and (3), the exchange rate suffers a permanent
devaluation accompanied by no interest rate volatility.
Case 2.  Permanent Increase in Future m.  By (2) and (3), a permanent increase in future
10 Moreover, as shown in Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Calvo (1983), interest-rate
targeting may leave the system without a nominal anchor, even in the case where credibility is
not an issue.
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money supply  (keeping m1 constant) results in an increase in both the current exchange ratem
and interest rate.
Under circumstances of poor credibility, a policymaker faced with currency depreciation,
who does not intend to increase future money supply, faces a serious dilemma: if money supply
in period 1 is not adjusted upward, the ex post real interest rate will increase, possibly generating
difficulties in the real and financial sectors.  On the other hand, if m1 is jacked up to stabilize
interest rates, credibility could be impaired and future expectations could become more unruly
and arbitrary.10
To increase realism, let us assume that the central bank pays interest im on money, and
that the demand for money satisfies:
where “~” on variable m is a reminder that it refers to interest-earning money.  Calvo and Végh
(1995) argue, in related models, that this is a simple way to introduce the typically very-short-run
interest rate controlled by the monetary authority.  It can readily be verified that equations (2) and
(3) are still valid for the present version, if one defines
Hence, under this interpretation, raising central-bank-controlled (CBC), interest rates would be
equivalent to lowering money supply.  In this context, the currency devaluation that would be
11 For empirical evidence on this issues see Calvo and Reinhart (2000b).
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caused by a positive shock on future money supply, could be partially or fully offset bym ,
raising CBC interest rates (recall equation (2)), a typical policy followed in EMs when the
exchange rate threatens to rise sharply.  Interestingly, by (3), the associated fall in m1 raises
market interest rates even more than if the central banks had stayed put.  So this analysis suggests
that in practice EMs have exhibited a pro-interest-rate-volatility bias.
If policy makers were faced with the choice between stabilizing i or stabilizing e, then the
decision would be clear: stabilize the exchange rate. Exchange rate stabilization provides the
economy with a clear-cut nominal anchor, while stabilizing interest rates does not.  In general,
policymakers will find it optimal to allow for some volatility in both variables, but always
steering clear from perfect interest rate stability.  This simple exercise illustrates why credibility
problems may bias the outcome towards lower exchange rate and higher interest rate volatility, as
borne by the facts. 
2. Other Reasons for Fear of Floating
The preceding discussion illustrated why lack of credibility may lead to a situation where
policy makers wind up stabilizing the exchange rate even at the expense of engaging in
procyclical policies.  However, there are numerous other reasons why exchange rate stability may
be highly sought. 11  In EMs devaluations (or large depreciations) tend to be associated with
recessions–not the kind of benign outcome stressed in standard textbooks.  This is hardly
surprising in light of the fact that in EMs there is pervasive liability dollarization.  Defaults and
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general debt servicing difficulties mount if the exchange rate is allowed slide significantly.  The
adjustments in the current account following these large exchange rate swings are far more acute
and abrupt in EM.  Credit market access is adversely affected by currency instability.   Exchange
rate volatility appears to by more damaging to trade in EMs; perhaps because trade is
predominantly invoiced in US dollars and hedging opportunities are more limited.  The
passthrough from exchange rate swings to inflation is far higher in EMs than in developed
economies.  This latter observation suggests that if policy makers are concerned about inflation,
there will be a tendency to cap exchange rate swings.  All these factors may help explain why, at
least historically there has been a marked tendency in most of the countries in our sample to
confine exchange rate movements to relatively narrow bands–an issue we turn to next.
III. Fear of Floating:  The Evidence
The preceding analysis suggested that, if lack of credibility is a serious problem, we
should expect more volatile interest rates and monetary aggregates in most EMs; we should also
expect less volatile exchange rates, as policymakers fear that efforts to smooth interest rates may
unhinge expectations.  The implied procyclicality of monetary policy suggests that the authorities
may tighten in response to adverse shocks, such as a decline in the terms of trade.  Furthermore,
if these variables are partly driven by changes in expected (as opposed to actual) money supply
we should observe a positive correlation between exchange and interest rates.  In this section and
the next, we confront these predictions with the data. 
Our data is monthly for thirty-nine countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Western
Hemisphere during the January, 1970-April 1999 period.  The countries are Argentina, Australia,
12 Our analysis, however, does not give equal attention to all these regimes.  In most of
the regimes in the earlier part of the sample, there are pervasive capital controls which are less
relevant for today’s environment. Also, a few of the floating exchange rate episodes occur during
hyperinflation, which makes it difficult to interpret and compare the results to other episodes.
13 The exchange rate is end-of-period.  Whenever possible interbank interest rates are
used; if these are not available a treasury bill rate is used.  All the comparable results for the
broader monetary aggregates money and quasi-money in the IMF’s definitions are not reported
here but available from the authors.
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Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Estonia, France,
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela. One-hundred-
and-fifty-four exchange rate arrangements are covered in this sample. 12  
In addition to the variables stressed in the analytical framework (exchange rates, nominal
and real interest rates, and money), we also focus on the time series properties of  international
reserves and a broad array of commodity prices (converted to the local currency) that are relevant
for specific countries.13  The motivation for including these two variables is straightforward.  In
the context of less-than-freely-floating exchange rates, purchases and sales of international
reserves are routinely a means for smoothing exchange rate fluctuations (often, alongside interest
rate policy, as discussed).  As regards commodity prices, we wish to examine the extent to which
the exchange rate is allowed to buffer commodity price shocks.  If  the exchange rate is allowed
to accommodate these shocks in countercyclical fashion--as the textbook models suggest when
there are asymmetric shocks and flexible exchange rates--then commodity prices in the local
currency should be relatively stable.   By contrast, if interest rate policy is procyclical, as
suggested earlier, and the exchange rate is not allowed to adjust in response to the terms of trade
14 See, for instance, Calvo (1999) and Reinhart (2000).
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shock, then commodity prices in the local currency will be volatile. The interactions among these
variables are examined in Section IV.
It is widely agreed upon that the “pure float” is an artifact of economics textbooks.  Yet,
despite occasional instances of foreign exchange market intervention, sometimes even in co-
ordinated fashion, the United States dollar, US $, floated about as freely against the German
Deutschemark, DM, (and now the euro) and the Japanese Yen, ¥, as any currency is allowed to
float.  For this reason, we compare countries that have regimes that are classified as freely-
floating or managed-floating against this “G-3" benchmark.  We next examine the behavior of
monthly percent changes (unless otherwise noted) of each variable, one at a time. 14 
We can glean what actual policy practices are by analyzing the frequency distributions of
exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, interest rates (real and nominal), and the monetary
aggregates around chosen intervals and comparing these across regimes.  
 According to the IMF’s classification scheme, countries are grouped into four types of
exchange rate arrangements: peg, limited flexibility, managed floating and, freely-floating. 
Limited flexibility has, almost exclusively, been used to classify European countries (prior to the
monetary union) with exchange rate arrangements vìs-a-vìs one another (i.e., the Snake, the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, etc.).  Hence, it is possible to evaluate the probability of a particular
change or changes in the exchange rate, reserves, etc. conditional on the announced exchange
rate regime.
Unless otherwise noted, the bilateral rates reported are with respect to the DM for the
European countries and with respect to the United States dollar for everyone else.  The choice of
15 Real interest rates will be denoted by r.
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the DM was owing to the fact that this was the most prominent reserve currency in Europe and,
as Germany was the low inflation country for many years, currencies in Europe were largely tied
to the DM.  For the remaining countries the dollar is the usual anchor currency of choice, as the
largest share of EM’s external debt is denominated in US dollars and world trade is
predominantly dollar invoiced.  
We denote the absolute value of the percent change in the exchange rate, foreign
exchange reserves, and base money by , R/R, m/m, respectively.  The change in the interest
rate, it - it-1 , is given by i.
15   Letting xc denote the absolute value for some critical threshold, we
can estimate the probability that the variable in question, x , (where x , can be , R/R, m/m, and
 i ), falls within some pre-specified bounds, conditional on a particular exchange rate
arrangement.
For example, if xc = 1 %, (i.e., x lies within a plus/minus one percent band), then 
P(x  < xc * Peg) > P(x  < xc  * Float) for x  =  .   In the textbook case, the probability that the
monthly exchange rate change falls within the one percent band should be greatest for the fixed
exchange regime and lowest for the freely floating arrangement, with the other two types of
arrangements spread in the middle.  Because shocks to money demand and expectations when the
exchange rate is fixed, are accommodated through purchases and sales of foreign exchange
reserves, the opposite pattern should prevail for changes in foreign exchange reserves and base
money.  Hence, for x = R/R and m/m, P(x  < xc  * Peg) < P(x  < xc  * Float).  Thus, the
probability that changes in reserves and the monetary base fall within a relatively narrow band is
a decreasing function of the degree of exchange rate rigidity, as money demand shocks and
16  For instance following the ERM crisis many European countries adopted (at least, in
principle) +/- 15 percent bands for the exchange rate.  Similarly, until recently Chile had
comparably wide bands.  Other examples include Mexico prior to December 1994 which had an
“ever-widening” band, as the lower end (appreciation) of the band was fixed and the upper
ceiling (depreciation) was crawling, Israel and Colombia during 1994-1998.
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changes in expectations are accommodated to smooth the exchange rate.
As regards interest rates, the predictions are less clear cut running strictly along the lines
of the extent of exchange rate flexibility .  As shown in Section II, the variability of interest rates
is more closely aligned with the extent of credibility.  If the authorities lack credibility and there
is fear of floating, then, irrespective of whether the regime is classified as a peg or as a float,
interest rate volatility is likely to be higher than when policies are credible. Hence, the likelihood
of observing relatively large fluctuations in interest rates will depend on both lack the credibility
of the exchange rate regime and on the willingness of the monetary authorities to use interest rate
policy as a means of stabilizing the exchange rate.
1.  Measuring Volatility: Exchange Rates 
Table 2 presents evidence of the frequency distribution of monthly exchange rate changes
(in percent) for recent or current episodes that are classified as freely floating regimes.  Our
chosen threshold values are,  xc = 1 %, and xc = 2.5 %, which is a comparatively narrow band.16 
For the United States, for example, there is about a 59 percent probability that the monthly US
$/DM exchange rate change falls within a relatively narrow plus/minus 2½ percent band.  For the
$/¥ exchange rate, that probability is slightly higher at 61 percent.  By contrast, for Bolivia,
Canada, and India (all declared floaters during that period), that probability falls in the 94-to-96
percent range.5  An alternative way of stating the same facts is that there is only about a 5 percent
17 The t-statistic for the difference in means test is 3.38 with a probability value of (0.00)
under the null hypothesis of no difference.
18  The variance of the monthly changes Mexican peso/US $ is about twice as large as the
variance of the monthly changes in the ¥/US $ exchange rate (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000b).
19 For a study of Peru’s fear of floating, see Morón, Goñi, and Ormeño, 1999, who
estimate an implicit intervention band.  For a discussion on East Asia’s Dollar Standard, see
McKinnon, 1999.
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probability in those countries that the exchange rate will change more than two-and-a-half
percent on any given month (versus more than forty percent for the US $/DM).  On average, for
the current crop of recent floaters, the probability that the exchange rate change is contained in
this moderate plus/minus two-and-a-half-percent band is over 79 percent--significantly above
that for the U.S. and Japan.17   By this metric, post-crisis Mexico approximates a float more
closely than any of the others--including Canada. 18, 19
Moderate-to-large monthly fluctuations in the exchange rate are even rarer among the so-
called “managed float” episodes (Table 3).  For Egypt and Bolivia, the probability of a monthly
exchange rate change greater than two-and-a-half percent is nil--this was also the case for
Indonesia and Korea up to the 1997 crisis.  Even for self-proclaimed flexible-rate advocates, such
as Chile and Singapore, the frequency distribution of their monthly exchange rate fluctuations
relative to the U.S. dollar do not vaguely resemble that of the US $/DM or US $/¥, with a
significantly higher proportion of observations falling within a narrow band; in the case of
Singapore, there is an 89 percent probability that monthly exchange rate changes are within a 2½
percent band, while for Chile that probability is only moderately lower. On average, there is an
88 percent probability that managed floaters’ monthly changes in the exchange rate are confined
to this narrow band. This exchange rate stability versus the US dollar (or DM if it is a European
20An issue we take up later in this section.
21 From Tables 2-5 we have, P(   < xc  * Peg) = 95.3 > P(   < xc  * Limited flexibility) =
92.0 > P(   < xc  * Managed Floating) = 87.5 > P(   < xc  * Float) = 79.3.
22 For the Float-Peg difference, the means test the probability value is (0.00); for the
Float-Managed, it is (0.04); for the Managed-Limited flexibility, the means test the probability
value is (0.32) while for the Limited flexibility-Peg it is (0.44).
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country) is surprising in light of the fact that for many of the emerging market countries during
these episodes, inflation rates have been well above those observed for the United States and
terms-of-trade shocks have been frequent and large. 20
Not surprisingly, the evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5 shows that for limited
flexibility arrangements and for pegs the probabilities that exchange rate changes are confined to
this band are even greater, at 92 and 95 percent respectively.  Hence, the observed behavior
according the change rate regime accords with the priors that exchange rate variability is least for
pegs and greatest for floaters. 21
What is most surprising is the narrowness of variation across regimes.  While the mean
probability that the exchange rate is contained inside a two-and-a-half band is significantly
different when comparing the fixed exchange rate regime with the “freely” floating, other
differences across regimes are blurred.  For example, the average probability that  < 2.5 percent
for “freely” floating regimes is not significantly different from that for managed floating, which,
in turn, is not significantly different from the “limited flexibility” arrangement.  There is also no
statistically significant difference between the limited flexibility category and the pegged
exchange rate.22
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2.  Measuring Volatility: International  Reserves 
Yet, exchange rates tell only part of the story of policy preferences.   We cannot glean
from exchange rates alone what would have been the extent of exchange rate fluctuations in the
absence of policy interventions--that is, we do not observe the counterfactual.  To assess the
extent of policy intervention to smooth out exchange rate fluctuations, we next examine the
behavior of foreign exchange reserves.  In principle, the variance of reserves should be zero in a
pure float.  The reality, however, it is not that simple, as reserves may change owing to
fluctuations in valuation and the accrual of interest earnings.  However, even absent these, there
are other factors that influence changes in reserves.  First, there are “hidden” foreign exchange
reserves transactions.  Credit lines may be used to defend the exchange rate during periods of
speculative pressures.  Indeed, several European countries, and particularly Ireland, made ample
use of their lines of credit during the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992-93.
Central banks may engage in derivative transactions, much along the lines of Thailand in 1997,
which borrowed dollars in the futures market, or issue debt denominated in a foreign currency,
such as Brazil continues to do.  These transactions hide the true level and variation in reserves.  
Secondly, even in the absence of any “hidden” reserve transactions, countries may rely more
heavily on open market operations and interest rate changes to limit exchange rate, as discussed
in Section II. 
Tables 6-9 summarizes the frequency distribution of monthly reserve changes (in U.S.
dollars).  With the exception of the United States and the few European countries in the sample,
most countries in Table 7 hold the lion’s share of their foreign exchange reserve holdings in
23 One may also want to construct an estimate of interest earned by the reserve holdings
and adjust the reported stocks accordingly. This is work in progress.
24 So while monthly changes in the Mexican peso/US $ exchange rate are almost twice as
variable as monthly changes in the ¥/US $ rate--changes in Mexico’s reserves are 18 times as
volatile as changes in U.S. reserves and 25 times as variable as changes in Japan’s reserves and
more than four times as volatile as Argentina’s reserves.
25 Nor is this exclusively an emerging market phenomenon--Canada’s and New Zealand’s
reserve changes are about seven times and five times, respectively, as volatile as that of the
United States.
26 The difference is statistically significant.
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dollar-denominated assets, hence, for this group valuation changes are not an issue.23  A  Table 7
shows, there is about a 74 percent probability that Japan’s monthly changes in foreign exchange
reserves falls in a plus/minus two-and-a-half percent band.  In the case of Mexico, there is only a
28 percent probability that changes are that small, while in the case of Bolivia that probability is
even lower; note that for post crisis Korea there is only a 6 percent probability that reserves
changes are inside the band.24  Indeed, for all other countries, large swings in foreign exchange
reserves appear to be commonplace, consistent with a higher extent of intervention in the foreign
exchange market--even relative to what is to be expected a priori from a freely floating exchange
rate regime.25  For the group of “floaters” the average probability is 16.2 percent--less that one-
half the Japan-U.S. average.26  Indeed, the observed behavior of international reserves runs 
counter to our priors--P(R/R, < xc  * Peg) < P(R/R, < xc *Float).  Indeed, for the 2.5 percent
band, we find that reserve variability is highest for the “floaters” and least for the limited
flexibility arrangements.
3.  Interest Rate Volatility, Lack of Credibility, and Procyclical Policies 
27 Egypt and Singapore are interesting exceptions
28 See Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) for details.
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As discussed in Section II, policy intervention to smooth exchange rate fluctuations need
not be limited to transactions in foreign exchange markets.  While interest rates in the United
States and Japan are predominantly set with domestic policy objectives in mind, interest rate
policy in many of the other countries in our sample accords a much higher weight to the
stabilization of the exchange rate–particularly when there are credibility problems.  It would be
difficult to justify the very high relative volatility of nominal and real interest rates in these
countries exclusively on the basis of changes in domestic “policy fundamentals,” as Tables 11-12
make plain. The probability that interest rate changes will be confined to a  plus/minus fifty-
basis-point band for the United States is about eighty-two percent--even including the historically
turbulent inflation stabilization period of the early 1980s.  For Japan, that probability is even
higher.  By contrast, during Mexico’s “floating exchange rate” regime, there is only a nine
percent probability that interest rate changes will be less-than or equal-to fifty basis points.  Such
stability in interest rates seems to elude most emerging markets--even some of those with capital
controls (such as India).27 
As is evident in Table 12, major interest rate changes (by G-3 standards) appear to be the
rule.  While the probability that interest rates change 500 basis points (five percent) on any given
month is about zero for the United States and Japan, that probability is close to thirty percent for
Mexico, Peru and India (among the floaters).  Nominal and real interest rates in India are about
four times as variable as in the U.S.; for Mexico, interest rates are about twenty times as variable,
but Peru holds the record.28  A recent example of Mexico’s use of high interest rates as a means
29 It is important to note that some countries with a highly regulated financial sector and
limited capital mobility simultaneously show exchange rate and interest rate stability; examples
include, Egypt, India (in the earlier managed floating period), Kenya, and Nigeria.
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to limiting exchange rate pressures (despite a slowing economy and an adverse terms-of-trade
shock) comes from the aftermath of the Russian crisis in August of 1998. 
Nor is Mexico unique in this regard among EMs. Turning to the managed floaters (Tables
13-14), other emerging markets, including Brazil, Chile, Turkey and Uruguay have an equally
high or higher incidence of large fluctuations in interest rates (Table 14). While in the case of
Turkey and Uruguay, it is at least partially owing to their comparatively high inflation rates, that
is  not the case for the others.  The picture painted by the volatility of real interest rates
(Appendix Tables 5 and 6) is quite similar. 
When comparing interest rate behavior across the four types of exchange rate regimes,
interest rates are the most stable for the limited flexibility group--which is almost exclusively
made up of European industrial countries--and least stable for the managed floating group, which
is predominantly comprised of EMs.29 Indeed, Calvo and Reinhart (2000b) show that the
variance of interest rates in low inflation in EMs is about four times that of developed
economies–that gap is far greater for countries with a history of inflation.
Moreover, such interest volatility is not the result of adhering to strict monetary targets in
the face of large and frequent money demand shocks.  In reality, most of these countries do not
have explicit or implicit money supply rules.  Interest rate volatility would appear to be the
byproduct of a combination of trying to stabilize the exchange rate through open market
operations and lack of credibility. 
The possible procyclicality of monetary policy, as discussed in the context of the model
30 These results are not presented here but are available from the author upon request.
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presented in Section II, is also evident in the high volatility of base money both relative to the
United States and relative to the exchange rate (Tables 19-22).  Other monetary aggregates show
similar volatility.30   In the case of a  float with a money supply rule we should expect to see,
P( m/m < xc  * Peg) < P( m/m < xc  * Float).  Instead, we find that the variability of the monetary
aggregates is highest for the floaters, particularly EMs.
3. Exchange rates, commodity prices, and fear of floating
Since the early literature on optimum currency areas, a compelling case for floating
versus fixing was made for the cases where idiosyncratic shocks were known to be frequent and
large.  For countries where a large share of exports is concentrated in a handful of commodities,
such idiosyncratic shocks are not difficult to identify.  In many EMs, swings in commodity prices
are a recurring source of disturbances.  These real shocks, it is argued, require an adjustment in
the real exchange rate.  It follows logically that if the exchange rate is allowed to adjust when
these shocks occur, one should observe a similar degree of volatility in commodity prices and the
exchange rate.  Put differently, commodity prices (which are usually quoted in dollars) when
converted to the local currency should be relatively stable–as periods when the commodity price
goes down (up) the exchange rate depreciates (appreciates).  Of course, if there is fear of floating,
the exchange rate adjustment does not occur and the domestic currency price of the commodity
also falls. 
For the countries in the sample where primary commodities loom large in exports, we
have culled information on commodity prices (converted to the local currency) on their top
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exports.  The volatility of commodity prices for the various exchange rate arrangements  is then
compared to that of the exchange rate.  Tables 22-25 provide the details.  The uniform message
from these tables is that commodity prices in the local currency are far more volatile than the
exchange rate.  For the group of floaters, the probability of a monthly fluctuations in excess of
five percent is about 38 percent while the comparable probability of a change in the exchange
rate of that magnitude is about 9 percent.  The gap between commodity prices and exchange rate
volatility is even wider for the managed floaters, which is comprised entirely of EMs.  For that
group, the probability of a change in excess of five percent is only about 4 percent for the
exchange rate and 39 percent for commodity prices.  Furthermore, as shown in Appendix Tables
3-6, in the overwhelming majority of cases the correlations between commodity prices and the
exchange rate are low and not statistically significant.  Indeed, in many cases they have the
wrong sign (i.e., positive).
These observations suggest that, despite the rationale for accommodating real terms of
trade shocks that the literature on optimum currency areas provides, countries (including many of
the floaters) often choose not to accommodate shocks.  Fear of an abrupt exchange rate swing in
these cases may dominate the perceived need to allow for the nominal and real exchange rate to
adjust.
4. General Observations About the Findings
In this section, we have presented evidence that the variability in international reserves,
base money, and interest rates, is high relative to the variance of the exchange rate.  The
particularly high variability in interest rates and money in EMs is consistent with the presence of
31 For evidence on the vast differences between EMs and developed economies in the
capital flow reversals during devaluations and the incidence and severity of the downgrades in
sovereign credit ratings following these events see Calvo and Reinhart (2000a and 2000b).  
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credibility problems and procyclical policies of the type discussed earlier. We also find that
commodity prices in the local currency are far more variable than the exchange rate and that there
is little correlation among the two.  This may suggest that the exchange rate is not often allowed
to play the shock absorber role textbooks assign to it. Taken together, these findings would
suggest that in many cases the authorities are attempting to stabilize the exchange rate through
both direct intervention in the foreign exchange market and open market operations–nor is fear of
floating limited to a particular region.  Indeed, in EMs has largely been confined to brief periods
following currency crisis or chaotic episodes of hyperinflation.  Furthermore, the far greater
variability of interest rates in EMs is a possible indication that lack of credibility is a fairly
common problem even in normal periods.  As suggested in Section II, the credibility problems
faced in many EMs may be so severe so as lead to the periodic loss of access to international
capital markets.31  
IV.  Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Dynamics
In the preceding section, we examined the time series properties of the variables of
interest individually.  In this section, we examine the lack of credibility hypothesis by focusing
on the interaction between exchange rates and interest rates.  The simple model developed in
Section II suggests that a permanent increase in future money supply (keeping the current money
supply constant) results in an increase in both the current exchange rate and interest rate. The
interest rate increase is even greater if the central bank increases its policy rate. This implies that,
32 Despite the fact that some pegs are actually narrow bands that allow for modest
variability.
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if these variables are partly driven by changes in expected (as opposed to actual) money supply
we should observe a positive correlation between the level of the exchange and the interest rate. 
However, as shown in Section III we also find ample evidence to suggest that there is
considerable intervention in the foreign exchange market in many of the cases under study.  For
this reason, we also include reserves in our analysis.
Since the three variables in question are nonstationary almost without exception in the
cases we analyze, we work with first differences.  As before, exchange rates, reserves, and
interest rates are denoted by , R/R, and  i, respectively.  To examine both temporal and
contemporaneous links among the variables, we opt for estimating a vector autoregression
(VAR).  The estimation is over the period spanned by an exchange rate regime; these are the
episodes shown in Tables 2-4.  Owing to insufficient variability in the exchange rate, we do not
include in this part of the analysis the cases where there is a peg.32  This method of defining the
sample has the appealing feature that it reduces the Lucas-critique-type problem, as we do not
sample variables accross a regime switch, where their interaction may change. The lag length was
chosen on a case-by-case basis using the Schwartz criteria.
We are interested in two sets of results.  The first of these focuses on the temporal
relationships, the standard block-exogeneity tests. The second examines the contemporaneous
relationship among the residuals.  
Given the large number of cases in our sample, we summarize the results as much as
33 The results on a country-by-country basis are available from the authors.
34 See, for example, the well-known results of Meese and Rogoff (1984) on the poor track
record of exchange rate models.
24
possible.33 Turning to the temporal causality results first, top panel of Table 26 presents a
summary for each of the three equations in the VAR of the proportion of cases where a particular
coefficient takes on a positive or negative sign and information of which these are statistically
significant at a five percent confidence level.  Not surprisingly, in most of the cases, the
exchange rate equations have the poorest fit while the interest rate equation has the best.34
We focus our attention on the exchange rate-interest rate link. As regards how interest
rate changes temporally affect the exchange rate (the exchange rate equation), no clear or
compelling pattern emerges. In 46 percent of the cases, the coefficient on the interest rate change
is positive, which is what can be expected when there are credibility problems and interest rate
increases signal future depreciations.  In the remaining 54 percent of the cases, the coefficient is
negative.  This would be the case when tight monetary policies (raising interest rates) lead to a
future appreciation.  However, recalling the model in Section II (when the central bank controls a
policy interest rate), a rise in interest rates that is an offset to an expected permanent increase in
the money supply may only be intended to prevent most or all of  the  depreciation--not engineer
an appreciation. At any rate, only in twenty percent of the cases are the coefficients significant. 
Reserve changes do not appear to temporally cause exchange rate changes in one direction or
another.
Turning to the interest rate equation, the most common pattern revealed in the data (68
percent), column (4), is that exchange rate changes are positively related to subsequent interest
35 Note that, this case has the highest proportion of cases where a coefficient was
statistically significant.  It is followed closely by a positive autoregressive parameter in the
interest rate equation, column (5).
36  See Reinhart and Montiel (1999) and Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) on the evidence on
sterilization policies in EMs.
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rate changes.  A depreciation leads to higher interest rates, as discussed earlier this may be the
case if either the central bank stays put (unchanged m1 or a less than full offset by the central
bank).  In thirty one percent of the cases, the coefficients were significant.35  Reserve
accumulation, most often, leads to a decline in interest rate, which is what can be expected if
there is only partial or no sterilization.  In the reserves equation, it is worth noting that in twenty
percent of the cases there is evidence of systematic temporal leaning-against-the wind feedback
rule, with reserves falling as a result of depreciation.  
We next turn to the contemporaneous correlations among the residuals. The bottom panel
shows the correlation patterns among the three pairs of residuals  and i,    and R/R, and  i
and R/R.  Three broad patterns prevail in the data.  First, consistent with the lack of credibility
hypothesis, in most instances, the correlation between the exchange rate and interest rates is
positive.  Secondly, in two-thirds of the cases the correlation between reserves and the exchange
rate is negative.  This may be interpreted as contemporaneous leaning-against-the-wind, an it is
in line with the high degree of reserve variability and fear of floating discussed earlier. Thirdly, in
nearly three-quarters of the cases, interest changes and reserve changes are negatively correlated. 
This has, at least, two possible interpretations. One explanation, is that reserve changes are
largely unsterilized--this is at odds with widespread practices of EMs and developed economies
alike. 36  The other, more plausible (in our view), is that reserves are built up in good states of
37 For interesting discussion of these issues, see Frankel, Schmukler, and Servén (2000).
38  See Goldstein (2000), for example.
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nature (i.e., lower international interest rates, higher credibility, inflation stabilization) that are
associated with declining interest rates and capital inflows.
In sum, while more work is clearly needed to identify credibility problems and its
attendant fear of floating, this analysis is broadly consistent with several of its implications. 
Interest rates and exchange rates move in the same direction, more often than not, and reserves
do not turn a blind eye to exchange rate fluctuations.
V.  Concluding Remarks
Since the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent crises in Russia and Brazil, many
observers have suggested that intermediate exchange rate regimes are vanishing and countries
around the world are moving toward corner solutions--hard pegs, such as currency boards,
dollarization, or currency unions, or, at the other end, freely-floating exchange rate regimes. 37  On
the surface, at least, this statement appears to accurately depict recent trends.  Eleven countries in
Europe chose to give up their national currencies, while Ecuador was the first of what may be
several countries in Latin America to adopt the United States dollar as its official national tender. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Russia, Chile, Colombia, and, more
recently, Poland have announced their intentions to allow their currencies to float freely.  On the
basis of labels, at least, it would appear that currency arrangements at the outset of the new
millennium will be very different.   If countries have either hard pegs or floating exchange rates,
some have argued, speculative attacks and currency crises will be a relic of the past.38  
39 Managed indeed, as all exchange rate movements versus the US dollar are contained
within a one percent band.
40Of course, one interpretation of these developments is that, burnt the serious liquidity
shortage faced during the 1997-1998 crisis, these countries are seeking to build a “war chest” of
international reserves so as to avoid having similar problems in the future.
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Yet, a careful reading of the evidence on exchange rate policy presents a strikingly
different picture.  Announcements of “intentions” to float, to be sure, are not new.  The
Philippines announced it would float on January 1988, yet less than ten years later, following its
1997 currency crises, its exchange rate policy  would be lumped together with the rest of the
affected Asian countries, under the commonly-used (but ill-defined) label of a “soft peg.”  
Bolivia announced it would float on September 1985, owing to its hyperinflation--despite this
announcement its exchange rate so closely tracked the United States dollar that the regime was
reclassified as a managed float on January 1998. 39  Korea and Thailand, despite their new floating
status, are amassing reserves at a hectic pace at the time of this writing. 40  Indeed, once financial
markets settled and capital flowed back to Asia, their currencies are fluctuating much the way they
did prior to the crisis--that is to say, they are not fluctuating at all.
Is the middle disappearing?  We don’t think so.  Fear of floating–or more generally, of
large currency swings-- is pervasive, particularly among EMs. The supposedly disappearing
middle accounts for the lion’s share of country practices.  Indeed, one of the hardest challenges
that a researcher or policy maker that is trying to draw lessons from the experiences of countries
that are at the corners faces is that there are hardly any countries there to study.  The experiences
of some of the floaters like the United States and Japan are not particularly relevant for EMs. 
Similarly, the number of countries with hard pegs are so few (excluding small islands), that it is
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difficult to draw generalized conclusions. 
One change that does appear to be taking place (Asia exempted) is that interest rate policy,
such as that discussed in Section II, is replacing foreign exchange intervention as the preferred
means of smoothing exchange rates.  This is evident in the high variability of interest rates in EMs
and in the practices of countries like Mexico and Peru.  Does this make countries less vulnerable
to currency crisis?  It is possible, but not probable.  As long as there is fear of floating
(irrespective of how exchange rate fluctuations are smoothed) the incentives for liability
dollarization will remain.  Furthermore, in the context of the framework discussed earlier, the
procyclicality in interest rate policy will have its limits (just as international reserves have their
limit), as interest rate hikes to defend the currency take their toll on the economy and the financial
sector.  Economic theory provides us with well-defined distinctions between fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes, but we are not aware of any criteria that allows us to discriminate as to
when a managed float starts to look like a soft peg.  Indeed, the evidence presented here suggests
it is often quite difficult to distinguish among the two.   All that we can say is that, when it comes
to exchange rate policy, discretion rules the day.
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Table 1. Exchange Rate Classification over the Years
Year





1970 97.2 0.0 0.0 2.8
1975 63.9 11.1 13.9 11.1
1980 38.9 5.6 47.2 8.3
1985 33.3 5.6 36.1 25.0
1990 19.4 13.9 30.6 36.1
1995 13.9 8.3 38.9 38.9
1999 11.1 11.1 33.3 44.5
33
Table 2. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating ” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal exchange rate falls within:





Japan February 1973-April 1999 33.8 61.2
Australia January 1984-April 1999 28 70.3
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 72.8 93.9
Canada June 1970-April 1999 68.2 93.6
India March 1993-April 1999 82.2 93.4
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 50 72.2
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 34.6 63.5
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 39.1 72.2
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 36.4 74.5
Norway December 1992-December 1994 79.2 95.8
Peru August 1990-April 1999 45.2 71.4
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 60.7 74.9
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 32.8 66.2
Spain January 1984-May 1989 57.8 93.8
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 35.1 75.5
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 52.9 77.9
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 51.67 79.27
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 17.83 11.41
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 9.5 14.3
Korea November 1997-April 1999 5.9 17.7
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 14.3 38.1
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Table 3. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Managed Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal exchange rate falls within:





Japan February 1973-April 1999 33.8 61.2
Bolivia January 1998-April 1999 100 100
Brazil July 1994-December 1998 83.1 94.3
Chile October 1982-April 1999 45.5 83.8
Colombia January 1979-April 1999 15.6 86.8
Egypt February 1991-December 1998 95.7 98.9
Greece January 1977-December 1997 58.6 85.3
India February 1979-February 1993 53.6 84.5
Indonesia November 1978-June 1997 96.4 99.1
Israel December 1991-April 1999 45.5 90.9
Kenya January 1998-April 1999 51 70.6
Korea March 1980-October 1997 80.1 97.6
Malaysia December 1992-September 1998 59.4 81.2
Mexico January 1989-November 1994 64.3 95.7
Norway January 1995-April 1999 56.9 90.2
Pakistan January 1982-April 1999 77.8 92.8
Singapore January 1988-April 1999 61.5 88.9
Turkey January 1980-April 1999 12.6 36.8
Uruguay January 1993-April 1999 22.7 92
Venezuela April 1996-April 1999 60.6 93.9
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 60.05 87.54
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 25.43 14.28
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Table 4. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility ” Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal exchange rate falls within:





Japan February 1973-April 1999 33.8 61.2
France March 1979-April 1999 86.7 97.5
Greece January 1998-April 1999 40 80
Malaysia January 1986-February 1990 71.4 98.1
Spain June 1989-April 1999 67 92.4
Sweden June 1985-October 1992 58.1 92.1
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 64.64 92.02
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 17.23 7.27
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Table 5. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Fixed ” Exchange Rate Regimes1
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal exchange rate falls within:





Japan February 1973-April 1999 33.8 61.2
Argentina March 1991-April 1999 97.9 100
Bulgaria June 1997-November 1999 65.5 93.1
Cote D’Ivoire January 1970-April 1999 97.7 99.4
Estonia June 1992-November 1999 85.4 100.0
Kenya January 1970-September 1993 56.7 85.6
Lithuania April 1994-November 1999 100.0 100.0
Malaysia March 1990-November 1992 84.4 96.9
Nigeria April 1993-April 1999 98.6 98.6
Norway December 1978-November 1992 55.7 86.8
Singapore January 983-December 1987 66.1 96.6
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 93.6 98.5
Venezuela July 1994-March 1996 95 95
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 83.05 95.88
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 17.22 5.01
1 Recent pegs with few monthly observations are Malaysia in September 1998 and Egypt in January 1999.
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Table 6. Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating” 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
foreign exchange reserves falls within:
+/- 1 percent
band 
+/- 2.5 percent band
United States February 1973-April 1999 28.6 62.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 44.8 74.3
Australia January 1984-April 1999 23.9 50
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 8.1 19.6
Canada June 1970-April 1999 15.9 36.6
India March 1993-April 1999 21.6 50
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 13.7 27.4
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 13.2 28.3
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 11.8 31.4
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 7.7 12.8
Norway December 1992-December 1994 36.1 51.9
Peru August 1990-April 1999 23.1 48.1
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 9.7 26.1
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 8.7 17.4
Spain January 1984-May 1989 18.5 40.1
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 8.9 33.3
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 17.7 32.9
Venezuela March 1989-June 1994 20.3 35.9
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 16.18 33.86
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 7.66 11.99
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 10 29.9
Korea November 1997-April 1999 0 5.6
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 9.1 40.9
1 Reserves are in US dollars.  Since the US holds its reserves in foreign currencies, much of the fluctuations in these
simply reflect valuation changes arising from fluctuations in the dollar.
38
Table 7. Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility in Recent or Current “Managed Floating” 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
foreign exchange reserves falls within:
+/- 1 percent
band 
+/- 2.5 percent band
United States February 1973-April 1999 28.6 62.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 44.8 74.3
Bolivia January 1998-April 1999 6.3 12.5
Brazil July 1994-December 1998 22.2 51.8
Chile October 1982-April 1999 21.3 48.2
Colombia January 1979-April 1999 28.4 54.2
Egypt February 1991-December 1998 37.8 69.4
Greece January 1977-December 1997 13.1 28.9
India February 1979-February 1993 13 36.7
Indonesia November 1978-June 1997 22.8 41.5
Israel December 1991-April 1999 19.1 43.8
Kenya January 1998-April 1999 0 14.3
Korea March 1980-October 1997 16.1 37.7
Malaysia December 1992-September 1998 34.3 55.7
Mexico January 1989-November 1994 15.3 31.9
Norway January 1995-April 1999 15.4 42.3
Pakistan January 1982-April 1999 3.9 12.1
Singapore January 1988-April 1999 31.1 74.8
Turkey January 1980-April 1999 10.3 23.3
Uruguay January 1993-April 1999 16.2 36.5
Venezuela April 1996-April 1999 11.8 29.4
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 17.81 39.21
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 10.05 17.55
1 Reserves are in US dollars.  Since the US holds its reserves in foreign currencies, much of the fluctuations in these
simply reflect valuation changes arising from fluctuations in the dollar.
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Table 8. Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility in Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility ” Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal exchange rate falls within:





Japan February 1973-April 1999 33.8 61.2
France March 1979-April 1999 31.4 54.9
Germany March 1973-April 1999 16.9 49.4
Greece January 1998-April 1999 6.3 31.3
Malaysia January 1986-February 1990 20 35.9
Spain June 1989-April 1999 36.9 64.7
Sweden June 1985-October 1992 13.5 39.3
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 20.83 45.92
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 11.41 12.68
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Table 9.  Foreign Exchange Reserve Volatility in Recent or Current “Fixed” 
Exchange Rate Regimes 1,2
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
foreign exchange reserves falls within:
+/- 1 percent
band 
+/- 2.5 percent band
United States February 1973-April 1999 28.6 62.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 44.8 74.3
Argentina March 1991-April 1999 15.3 36.7
Bulgaria June 1997-November 1999 20.7 48.2
Cote D’Ivoire January 1970-April 1999 2.3 8.7
Estonia June 1992-November 1999 12.4 32.6
Kenya January 1970-September 1993 7.8 20.8
Lithuania April 1994-November 1999 10.5 37.3
Malaysia March 1990-November 1992 9.1 39.4
Nigeria April 1993-April 1999 4.4 8.9
Norway December 1978-November 1992 14.3 35.1
Singapore January 1983-December 1987 51.7 83.3
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 21.3 50.2
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 15.44 36.47
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 13.43 20.79
1 Reserves are in US dollars.  Since the US holds its reserves in foreign currencies, much of the fluctuations in these
simply reflect valuation changes arising from fluctuations in the dollar.
2 Recent pegs with few monthly observations are Malaysia in September 1998 and Egypt in January 1999.
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Table 10. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate falls within:
+/- 0.25
percent




United States February 1973-April 1999 59.7 80.7
Japan February 1973-April 1999 67.9 86.4
Australia January 1984-April 1999 28.1 53.9
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 16.3 25.9
Canada June 1970-April 1999 36.1 61.9
India March 1993-April 1999 6.4 15.9
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 19.6 25.5
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 5.7 9.4
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 40 59.4
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 89.7 91
Norway December 1992-December 1994 32.1 51.9
Peru August 1990-April 1999 24.8 32.3
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 22.1 38.9
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 35.6 53.1
Spain January 1984-May 1989 30.8 41.5
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 71.8 91.1
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 11.6 32.6
Venezuela March 1989-June 1994 62.5 62.5
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 33.33 46.68
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 23.44 23.68
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 0 0
Korea November 1997-April 1999 13.3 19.9
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 4.6 9.1
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Table 11. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes (continued)
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate is greater than:
+/- 4 percent
 (400 basis points)
+/- 5 percent
(500 basis points)
United States February 1973-April 1999 0.3 0.3
Japan February 1973-April 1999 0 0
Australia January 1984-April 1999 0 0
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 14.8 11.8
Canada June 1970-April 1999 2.8 2.1
India March 1993-April 1999 23.8 30.6
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 15.7 11.8
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 37.7 28.3
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 1.8 0.6
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 1.4 1.4
Norway December 1992-December 1994 4.1 4.1
Peru August 1990-April 1999 31.4 29.5
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 1.5 0.7
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 0.5 0
Spain January 1984-May 1989 4.1 4.1
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 1.3 0
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 3.6 3.6
Venezuela March 1989-June 1994 18.7 17.2
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 10.20 9.11
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 12.08 11.28
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 75 70.1
Korea November 1997-April 1999 13.3 6.7
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 22.7 22.7
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Table 12. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Managed Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate falls within:
+/- 0.25
percent




United States February 1973-April 1999 59.7 80.7
Japan February 1973-April 1999 67.9 86.4
Bolivia January 1998-April 1999 31.1 43.8
Brazil July 1994-December 1998 11.1 20.4
Chile October 1982-April 1999 5 11.1
Colombia January 1979-April 1999 50.6 62.6
Egypt February 1991-December 1998 78.9 93.7
Greece January 1977-December 1997 75.7 93.8
India February 1979-February 1993 49.7 60.9
Indonesia November 1978-June 1997 30.6 46.8
Israel December 1991-April 1999 26.4 44.8
Kenya January 1998-April 1999 28.6 42.8
Korea March 1980-October 1997 31.1 51.9
Malaysia December 1992-September 1998 66.7 83.3
Mexico January 1989-November 1994 8.3 16.7
Norway January 1995-April 1999 65.9 85.1
Pakistan January 1982-April 1999 34.8 43.5
Singapore January 1988-April 1999 51.9 75.6
Turkey January 1980-April 1999 3.4 5.1
Uruguay January 1993-April 1999 2.7 8
Venezuela April 1996-April 1999 n.a. n.a.
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 36.25 49.44
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 25.03 29.25
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Table 13. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Managed Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes (continued)
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate is greater than:
+/- 4 percent
 (400 basis points)
+/- 5 percent
(500 basis points)
United States February 1973-April 1999 0.3 0.3
Japan February 1973-April 1999 0 0
Bolivia January 1998-April 1999 0 0
Brazil July 1994-December 1998 25.9 22.2
Chile October 1982-April 1999 51.2 43.2
Colombia January 1979-April 1999 2.9 1.6
Egypt February 1991-December 1998 0 0
Greece January 1977-December 1997 0.7 0.7
India February 1979-February 1993 11.2 7.7
Indonesia November 1978-June 1997 5.2 4
Israel December 1991-April 1999 1.1 1.1
Kenya January 1998-April 1999 1.1 0
Korea March 1980-October 1997 0 0
Malaysia December 1992-September 1998 2.9 1.4
Mexico January 1989-November 1994 13.9 8.3
Norway January 1995-April 1999 0 0
Pakistan January 1982-April 1999 14.1 7.7
Singapore January 1988-April 1999 0 0
Turkey January 1980-April 1999 61.4 55.7
Uruguay January 1993-April 1999 60.1 52.3
Venezuela April 1996-April 1999 n.a. n.a.
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 13.98 11.44
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 21.31 18.87
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Table 14. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility”
Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate falls within:
+/- 0.25
percent




United States February 1973-April 1999 59.7 80.7
Japan February 1973-April 1999 67.9 86.4
France March 1979-April 1999 60.5 78.2
Germany March 1973-April 1999 63.1 80.6
Greece January 1998-April 1999 14.3 42.9
Malaysia January 1986-February 1990 52.1 68
Spain June 1989-April 1999 58.1 81.5
Sweden June 1985-October 1992 37.1 60.7
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 47.53 68.65
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 18.74 15.01
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Table 15. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility”
Exchange Rate Regimes (continued)
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate is greater than:
+/- 4 percent
 (400 basis points)
+/- 5 percent
(500 basis points)
United States February 1973-April 1999 0.3 0.3
Japan February 1973-April 1999 0 0
France March 1979-April 1999 0.8 0.8
Germany March 1973-April 1999 1.6 1.3
Greece January 1998-April 1999 0 0
Malaysia January 1986-February 1990 3.9 2.1
Spain June 1989-April 1999 0 0
Sweden June 1985-October 1992 3.4 2.2
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 1.62 1.07
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 1.69 0.98
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Table 16. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Fixed”
Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate falls within:
+/- 0.25
percent




United States February 1973-April 1999 59.7 80.7
Japan February 1973-April 1999 67.9 86.4
Argentina March 1991-April 1999 14.3 31.6
Bulgaria June 1997-November 1999 57.2 89.3
Cote D’Ivoire January 1970-April 1999 93.4 95.7
Estonia June 1992-November 1999 40.0 64.3
Kenya January 1970-September 1993 53.1 69.2
Lithuania April 1994-November 1999 14.9 20.9
Malaysia March 1990-November 1992 72.7 96.9
Nigeria April 1993-April 1999 97.2 97.2
Norway December 1978-November 1992 30.4 51.2
Singapore January 1983-December 1987 50.1 76.7
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 24.1 41.2
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 52.33 69.30
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 29.11 27.50
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Table 17. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Fixed”
Exchange Rate Regimes (continued)
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate is greater than:
+/- 4 percent
 (400 basis points)
+/- 5 percent
(500 basis points)
United States February 1973-April 1999 0.3 0.3
Japan February 1973-April 1999 0 0
Argentina March 1991-April 1999 18.4 17.3
Bulgaria June 1997-November 1999 3.57 3.57
Cote D’Ivoire January 1970-April 1999 0 0
Estonia June 1992-November 1999 5.7 2.9
Kenya January 1970-September 1993 1.5 1.5
Lithuania April 1994-November 1999 19.4 11.9
Malaysia March 1990-November 1992 0 0
Nigeria April 1993-April 1999 1.4 1.4
Norway December 1978-November 1992 6.5 2.4
Singapore January 1983-December 1987 0 0
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 2.4 0.8
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 5.35 3.80
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 7.05 5.60
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Table 18. Volatility in Base Money Recent or Current “Floating ” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal monetary base rate falls within:
+/- 1 percent band +/- 2 percent band
United States
$/DM
February 1973-April 1999 42.1 67.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 22.7 41.9
Australia January 1984-April 1999 43.7 72.1
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 19.1 33.8
Canada June 1970-April 1999 32.9 60.7
India March 1993-April 1999 27.4 53.4
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 13.7 31.4
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 5.7 22.7
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 18.9 37.9
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 14.1 18
Norway December 1992-December 1994 16 20
Peru August 1990-April 1999 22.9 34.3
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 12.5 27.9
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 45.4 75
Spain January 1984-May 1989 15.4 32.3
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 21.8 29.5
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 15.6 25.9




Standard deviation, excluding U.S.
and Japan
11.26 17.95
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 4.8 9.5
Korea November 1997-April 1999 6.3 12.5
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 22.7 45.5
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Table 19. Volatility in Base Money Recent or Current “Managed Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal monetary base rate falls within:
+/- 1 percent band +/- 2 percent band
United States
$/DM
February 1973-April 1999 42.1 67.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 22.7 41.9
Bolivia January 1998-April 1999 0 0
Brazil July 1994-December 1998 16.7 27.8
Chile October 1982-April 1999 29.2 53.8
Colombia January 1979-April 1999 24.1 40.5
Egypt February 1991-December 1998 30.5 52.6
Greece January 1977-December 1997 18.7 33.7
India February 1979-February 1993 23.7 46.8
Indonesia November 1978-June 1997 16.9 33.9
Israel December 1991-April 1999 23.8 39.3
Kenya January 1998-April 1999 35.7 71.4
Korea March 1980-October 1997 12.3 24.1
Malaysia December 1992-September 1998 24.3 47.2
Mexico January 1989-November 1994 15.3 27.8
Norway January 1995-April 1999 11.8 17.7
Pakistan January 1982-April 1999 20.6 40.2
Singapore January 1988-April 1999 27.4 51.1
Turkey January 1980-April 1999 12.2 21.7
Uruguay January 1993-April 1999 17.1 39.5








Table 20. Volatility in Base Money Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility ” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal monetary base rate falls within:
+/- 1 percent band +/- 2 percent band
United States
$/DM
February 1973-April 1999 42.1 67.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 22.7 41.9
France March 1979-April 1999 18.5 35.7
Germany March 1973-April 1999 15.3 37.1
Greece January 1998-April 1999 0 6.3
Malaysia January 1986-February 1990 30 46
Spain June 1989-April 1999 9.6 17.4








Table 21 Volatility in Base Money Recent or Current “Fixed ” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country Period Probability that the monthly percent change in
nominal monetary base rate falls within:
+/- 1 percent band +/- 2 percent band
United States
$/DM
February 1973-April 1999 42.1 67.2
Japan February 1973-April 1999 22.7 41.9
Argentina March 1991-April 1999 14.3 31.6
Bulgaria June 1997-November 1999 14.3 32.1
Cote D’Ivoire January 1970-April 1999 9.2 20.8
Estonia June 1992-November 1999 12.4 31.5
Kenya January 1970-September 1993 11.6 23.6
Lithuania April 1994-November 1999 14.9 29.9
Malaysia March 1990-November 1992 36.4 60.6
Nigeria April 1993-April 1999 14.5 24.6
Norway December 1978-November 1992 16.1 26.8
Singapore January 983-December 1987 30 50
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 19.8 44.7
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 17.59 34.20
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 8.29 12.38
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Table 22. Commodity Price Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating ” Exchange Rate Regimes 
Country and relevant
commodity (ies)
Period Probability that the monthly percent change
falls within:


























































Mexico: Oil December 1994-April 1999 10.4 37.5 84.6
New Zealand: Wool
Lamb









































South Africa January 1983-April 1999 85.6











Average 15.90 61.77 90.71
Standard deviation 6.49 15.10 8.07
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Period Probability that the monthly percent change
falls within:


























Chile: Copper October 1982-April 1999 13.4 65.9 98.1
Colombia: Coffee
Oil















Indonesia: Crude oil November 1978-June 1997 49.5 79.7 99.1
Kenya: Beverages
Tea















































Average 14.21 60.82 95.76
Standard deviation 12.51 14.45 8.33
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Period Probability that the monthly percent change
falls within:









Sweden: Pulp June 1985-October 1992 23.6 92.1 100
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Period Probability that the monthly percent change
falls within:













































































Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 14.83 58.71 98.44
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 3.08 6.65 2.05
1 Recent pegs with few monthly observations are Malaysia in September 1998 and Egypt in January 1999.
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Table 26.  The Temporal and Contemporaneous Interaction Patterns
Temporal Causality
Proportion of the cases in which the coefficients are:
Exchange rate equation, Interest rate equation, it Reserves Equation, R/R
it R/R  it R/R it R/R




0.1 0.12 0 0.3 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.26




0.04 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.3 0.22 0.2 0.14 0.14
Contemporaneous correlations 
Proportion of the cases in which the correlation coefficients of the residuals are:
Corr ( , it)  Corr ( , R/R)  Corr( it, R/R)











Appendix Table 1. Real Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in real
interest rate falls within:
+/- 0.25
percent




United States February 1973-April 1999 48.2 75.4
Japan February 1973-April 1999 25 49.7
Australia January 1984-April 1999 25.5 41.6
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 5.9 12.6
Canada June 1970-April 1999 33.8 51.4
India March 1993-April 1999 6.4 15.9
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 7.8 15.7
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 8.7 13
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 21.6 37.7
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 23.1 30.8
Norway December 1992-December 1994 24.1 44.1
Peru August 1990-April 1999 7.1 16.3
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 14.1 28.2
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 21.7 40.7
Spain January 1984-May 1989 12.3 24.6
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 36.6 66.2
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 8.6 13.6
Venezuela March 1989-June 1994 10.9 25
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 0 0
Korea November 1997-April 1999 8.3 25
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 7.1 7.1
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Appendix Table 2. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating”
Exchange Rate Regimes (continued)
Country Period Probability that the monthly change in
nominal interest rate is greater than:
+/- 4 percent
 (400 basis points)
+/- 5 percent
(500 basis points)
United States February 1973-April 1999 0.3 0.3
Japan February 1973-April 1999 0 0
Australia January 1984-April 1999 0.7 0
Bolivia September 1985-December 1997 24.5 15.6
Canada June 1970-April 1999 3.5 1.8
India March 1993-April 1999 21.8 19
Kenya October 1993-December 1997 12.5 12.5
Mexico December 1994-April 1999 32.6 30.5
New Zealand March 1985-April 1999 6.4 4.9
Nigeria October 1986-March 1993 14.1 9.1
Norway December 1992-December 1994 4.1 4.1
Peru August 1990-April 1999 47.8 47.8
Philippines January 1988-April 1999 5.2 5.2
South Africa January 1983-April 1999 0 0
Spain January 1984-May 1989 3.1 3.1
Sweden November 1992-April 1999 1.4 0
Uganda January 1992-April 1999 22.2 11.1
Venezuela March 1989-June 1994 27.2 25
Memorandum: The Post-Asian-crisis “floaters”
Indonesia July 1997-April 1999 92.9 85.7
Korea November 1997-April 1999 16.7 8.2
Thailand July 1997-April 1999 35.8 35.8
Appendix Table 3. Correlation between Changes in Commodity Prices and Changes in the Exchange Rate:
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Floating Exchange Rates
Country Commodity Period Correlation Standard Error

























Mexico Oil Dec.94 to Apr. 99 -0.149 0.148




Nigeria Oil October 1986 to
March 1993
0.002 0.115
Groundnut Oil 0.134 0.114
Groundnut 0.165 0.113













Sweden Pulp Nov.92 to Apr.99 -0.735 missing data






Appendix Table 4. Correlation between Changes in Commodity Prices and Changes in the Exchange Rate:
Managed Floating
Country Commodity Period Correlation Standard Error









Chile Copper Oct.82 to Apr.99 0.021 0.073









Indonesia Crude Oil Nov.78 to Jun.97 -0.014 0.066









Mexico Oil Jan.89 to Nov.94 0.059 0.121


















Appendix Table 5. Correlation between Changes in Commodity Prices and Changes in the Exchange Rate:
Limited Flexibility
Country Commodity Period Correlation Standard Error
Sweden Pulp Jun.85 to Oct.92 -0.550 0.089
Appendix Table 6. Correlation between Changes in Commodity Prices and Changes in the Exchange Rate:
Fixed Exchange Rates
Country Commodity Period Correlation Standard Error
Argentina Wheat March 1991 to
April 1999
-0.073 0.130
Frozen Beef 0.076 0.130
Cote D’Ivoire Beverages Jan.70 to Apr.99 N/A N/A

























Venezuela Oil July 1994 to
March 1996
0.223 0.224
Metals -0.120 0.228
